The Oversight Function of the National Assembly: Brief Discussion of “The Rubberstamp Legislature” Since 1999

Article

BY

OOREOLUWA. O AGBEDE* AND FOPE. G AGBEDE**

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The rationale behind powers and functions separation is hinged on the principle that “when the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty”[1]. The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria[2] provides for the powers and functions of the legislature, executive and the judiciary respectively, clearly distinguishing between their different functions and giving each a certain degree of control over the other while providing for their coordination and co-operation.

2.0 LEGISLATURE

The legislative power of the federation is vested in the National Assembly to make law for the peace order and good governance of the Federation and alongside this primary function is the oversight function of the National Assembly to check mate abuse of power and effectuate good governance in Nigeria. Despite the unarguable supremacy of the law[3], one cannot downplay the effect of Politics in general administration of governance, wherein we see the prevalence of a Legislature with the majority being from the same political party as the president, acting more as a mere rubberstamping official than an independent arm of government. This raises some questions as to the extent in which the successive National Assembly has succeeded in checkmating and overseeing the executive?

3.0 OVERSIGHT FUNCTIONS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

Oversight in this instance means the exercise of constitutional powers by the legislature to check or control the exercise of constitutional powers of the other arms of government, specifically to check the exercise of executive powers while being guided by principles of accountability to the electorate[4]. Although fundamentally different, the primary functions of the legislatures sometimes coincide with the oversight function, for instance, while performing the law making function[5], the National Assembly performs its oversight function by regulating the public funds.

4.0 INTERROGATINGTHE PREVALENCE OF RUBBERSTAMP LEGISLATURE SINCE 1999

Before looking into the rubberstamp practice of the legislature, it is however gratifying to put on record that the National Assembly has made few strides thus;

  1. Partially resolving the issues considered by the Electoral Reform Committee by making some changes to INEC’s funding, the amendment allowed the INEC to be funded from the Consolidated Fund, making the INEC as independent as the judiciary and the National Assembly in terms of funding[6].
  2. Enacting some Statutes to promote good governance (e.g., Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) Act and the Independent Corruption and other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) Act).
  3. The Senate has rejected the nominations of the president at few times. One of such is the nomination of Olalekan Raheem as a Resident Electoral Commissioner (REC) of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) which is in good exercise of its oversight function.
  4. The mismanagement of Petroleum Technology Development Funds (PTDF) and associated shady deals by former President Obasanjo and his vice, Alhaji Atiku Abubakar were exposed by the National Assembly.
  5. A committee of the lower house in 2007 exposed the misappropriation of funds meant for the national power project.
  6. The misappropriation of oil subsidy funds was also exposed by a senate committee in 2012.

What is a rubberstamp legislature? A rubberstamp in a metaphorical-political sense refers to a person or institution with considerable de jure power but little de facto power. A rubberstamp is one that rarely or never disagrees with more powerful organizations, with the key quality being docility.  A rubberstamp legislature is also known as a toy parliament[7]. One of the lessons from history as relates to this, is that examples of Fascism, Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism from different times all share a common denominator; a rubberstamp legislature; the Reichstag of Nazi Germany, the communist parliaments like the Chinese National People’s Congress, or the Italian Chamber of Fasces and Corporations. Despite the necessity of co-operation between the various arms, the separation of powers would be nugatory if one arm willingly gives another arm the control of its hands and brain, this nugatory effect arises by result of a rubberstamp legislature.

Is Nigeria’s Federal legislature a rubberstamp?

  1. The constitution grants the senate the power to approve certain presidential appointees, hereby giving them the power of scrutinizing presidential appointees and giving their approval or disapproval upon certain investigation. Most times, the National Assembly in exercising this function is influenced by party politics, hereby turning itself into a rubber stamp National Assembly without properly scrutinizing the recommended appointees. For instance, the Senate failed to properly scrutinize the certificates of the sacked Minister of Finance to discover the forgery of NYSC certificate[8]. The Federal Minister of Communication and Digital Economy terrorism controversy is an example of legislative oversight failure because if he has been properly scrutinized, the appointment might not have been an easy ride.
  2. Sections 88 and 89 1999CFRN grants the National Assembly the power to make investigation and summon anybody charged with executing any law made by the National Assembly or granted power to administer funds appropriated by the National Assembly in order to enable the house make laws and to eradicate corruption. However, the National Assembly exercises this power in bad faith as the process is often riddled with irregularities. The cases of; Tony Momoh v Senate[9] where the court held that no powers exist under the section for general investigation, nor for the aggrandizement of the house, El-Rufai v House of Representatives where the court held generally, it will not interfere in the internal affairs of the house, but it will interfere where there has been non-compliance by the legislature with the provisions of the constitution, and Senator Ovie Omo-Agege v The President of the National Assembly where the court held that the investigative power of the National Assembly cannot be used to probe into criminal matters, are examples of instances of such irregularities. Also, members of the committee set up to investigate issues often time use it as an avenue to enrich themselves through bribery. For instance, the “Honorable” Farouk Lawan scandal where the Chairman, House of Representatives Ad Hoc Committee on the Monitoring of Fuel Subsidy is alleged have demanded and received US$500,000 as gratification to remove Zenon Oil from companies being investigated. The allegation, although initially denied, was later admitted on the questionable basis that the money was intended to be reported and tendered as an exhibit[10].

Over various executive administrations, there have been allegations about the legislature sacrificing their inherent independence and serving a rubberstamp function, but these allegations have increased in the General Buhari’s second “democratic” tenure, and in response to this questions as to the “always yes” nature of the 9th National Assembly, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Femi Gbajabiamilan and the Senate president, Ahmad Lawan have contradicted themselves multiple times, sometimes claiming that the National Assembly would defend the separation of powers and at other times, positing that it would do the bidding of the current administration. The Senate President once stated that the National Assembly presumed that any request from Buhari was definitely going to make Nigeria a better place, hereby overlooking the inherent fallibility of men, surrendering the rights of the people and sacrificing Democracy for alleged expediency. He promised that any request of the President would be treated expeditiously.

The Senate president also claimed that the Legislature’s relationship with the Executive is misunderstood by many, claiming that their focus is; “how do we work with the executive to make Nigeria better?” using collaboration and cooperation as a defence for their obvious docility. However I believe that the legislature is mistaken by the principles of democracy and the difference between working with, and working for (the executive and their respective individual interest with no connection to the interest of the people). 

For the purpose of clarity, nobody expects the two arms to be at constant loggerheads like theBukola Saraki led Senate, but the over-cooperation of the previous and current assemblies, which is definitely not for the interest of the people, is very worrying, and the 2019 allocation of N37bn for the renovation of the National Assembly building with the approval of the President lays credence that the current relationship is more of “scratch my back, I lick your feet” than “we scratch each other’s back for the public benefit”.

5.0 REASONS FOR THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY INEFFECTIVENESS

Some of the reasons for the ineffectiveness and rubberstamp nature of the legislature include corruption, tribalism and nepotism, lack of democratic culture, absence of true fiscal independence of the legislature, personal interests and ambitions of the legislators among others.

6.0 RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

Although from 1999, it is undeniable that all the National Assemblies have acted, to varying degrees, as mere rubberstamps, with the least being the Senate under Bukola Saraki, it is a bit comical that the leaders of the bicameral 9th Assembly legislature have protested being called a rubberstamp National Assembly, despite showing by their conduct and words that they are in practice, a rubberstamp legislature. If the present Assembly desires to prove their allegers wrong, they will need to;

  1. Adhere to the basic tenets of the principle of separation of power as provided in the 1999 Constitution. The legislature should be guided by professionalism and the globally tested legislative working ethics.
  2. Make the interest of the country override their personal, common and joint interest. Congressional assignments should not serve as sources of exploitation to enrich individuals.
  3. Abhor fraudulent enrichment because it is a total negation of social value and ethics of good governance, expectations and aspirations of the electorates.
  4. Advance that their oversight functions should be beyond mere investigation and recommendation. There is a need for constitutional structure for effective and efficient legislative oversight, as a watchdog on the executive arm and its agencies.

The above can truly be actualized, but it depends on the willingness of the federal Legislature in protecting and upholding the separation of powers and performing their functions. While the Legislature is the gatekeeper of democracy, the Judiciary is the gatekeeper of the Constitutional rights of the people, but unlike the limitations of the Judiciary which are linked to their financial non-independence, the same cannot be wholly said of the legislature. Although the National Assembly over the years has been able to discharge a few of its oversight Function to very low degree, it has not been as effective as required. For there to be an improvement, there must be a desire of the legislature to actually do their job and oversee the democracy.

 

 

 

*Ooreoluwa O. Agbede LL.B(University of Lagos), B.L (Abuja) is a new wig, an avid writer, researcher and editor. He was an Associate Editor and Senior Associate Editor for the Unilag Law Review. He can be reached at agbedeoore@gmail.com.

**Fope G. Agbede is a law student of the Faculty of Law, University of Lagos. He is a digital currency and blockchain technology expert. He can be reached at Agbedefopefoluwagabriel@gmail.com.

[1] Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, Esprit de lois, Book XI, Chapter 4 and Chapter 6.

[2]Section 4, 5 and 6(and more elaborately under chapters 5,6 and 7) of the 1999Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as amended in 2011.

[3] Section 1 and 3 Supra endnote 2.

[4] Oyelowo Oyewo, “Constitutionalism and the oversight functionsof the legislature in Nigeria”

[5] Section 59 and 81 Supra endnote 2.

[6] Available at https://www.loc.gov/law/help/nigeria-election-law/index.php  last accessed 4/27/2021.

[7] https://nation.com.pk/07-Sep-2017/the-toy-parliament

[8] Jude Egbas, “All you need to know about minister’s NYSC certificate scandal” available at https://www.pulse.ng/news/local/kemi-adeosun-all-you-need-to-know-about-ministers-nysc-certificate-scandal/qsc300w last accessed 4/28/2021

[9]Momoh v. Senate of the National Assembly (1983) 4 NCLR 269

[10] “Nigerian Farouk Lawan charged over $3m fuel scam ‘bribe”, available at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-21294154 last accessed on the 14th day of June, 2021.

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